The post-Brexit era aims of Great Britain’s foreign policy revolves around “Global Britain.” The definition of “Global Britain” and what it constitutes remains vague and requires a more straightforward explanation. The term “Global Britain” is mostly used for Britain’s adjustments to global politics after the Brexit and resembles the longing of Britain’s good old days when she dominated the world(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018). As the United Kingdom decided to exit the European Union to achieve more independence in her policymaking, this topic has been on both Theresa May and Boris Johnson governments’ agendas.

For Theresa May government Brexit meant that Britain was not turning herself away from the world; on the contrary, it symbolizes the moment when Britain will become truly “Global Britain.” In her speech on 17 January 2017, she argued that “United Kingdom’s place in the European Union came at the expense of our global ties, and of a bolder embrace of free trade with the wider world. Our political traditions are different. Unlike other European countries, we have no written constitution, but the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is the basis of our unwritten constitutional settlement. (The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU, n.d.)” She also argues that the UK trade has stagnated since joining the EU, which is why Britain should now focus more on global trade, including countries like the United States, China, Brazil, the Gulf States, Australia, New Zealand, and India. She drew a very optimistic future for Britain in this speech.

Boris Johnson’s government does not differ from Theresa May’s government regarding “Global Britain.” Johnson’s speeches at both Chatham House on 2 December 2016 and Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 19 April 2018 shows that he has similar ideas with Theresa May. In the Chatham House speech, he repeats May’s statement that Brexit does not mean that Britain is turning inwards; on the opposite, it means that Britain is now more outward-looking, engaging, and more open to new agreements. He also claimed that people around the world are expecting an engagement from Britain and looking for British leadership(Beyond Brexit, n.d.).

In Johnson’s view of “Global Britain,” Britain has a responsibility to contribute to the global stability, maintain good relations established with Europe but not under the roof of the European Union now, take an active role in combatting terrorism with NATO and the EU as one of the few countries who manage to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense and 20 percent of their defense budget on new equipment(Beyond Brexit, n.d.).

He also points out that “Global Britain” is not limited to Europe; it expands to the other parts of the world, most notably East Asia and China. Free trade, in that sense, is crucial for Britain. As mentioned in the House of Commons report, Britain could act as a “hub” for international trade. Johnson is willing to accept that the international order needs to change and supports enlarging the Security Council’s permanent membership to other global powers, including India. In parallel to this policy, Britain has joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, capitalized primarily by China, as one of the few earliest countries to participate.

Could ‘Global Britain’ policy will be a good compensation for the weakening EU pillar in British foreign policy?

To be a good compensation, first, there is a need for a clear definition of the “Global Britain” and a roadmap for how to do it. It is highly disputed that what does “Global Britain” mean and how does it differ from earlier policies. The ambiguity of the term expands the scope of aims so much that it creates doubt about its success chances. Which area will be the focus point, and how long is it going to take to get results from the policy? What are the strategies and resources? Are there any backup plans if things do not go in a predicted way (like Covid-19), if so, what are they? If Britain aims to be truly global, then under which framework could earlier policies be explained? These are some of the questions that are waiting for answers.

According to Theresa May’s speech, the “Global Britain” has focused on four primary areas, namely: free trade agreement with the EU, trade agreements with countries other than the EU members, maintain the global soft power and combatting crime and terrorism (“The Real Meaning of ‘Global Britain,'” 2019). These four areas resemble the post-world war II era of British foreign policy in the sense of Atlanticism and close relations with the Commonwealth. The “Global Britain” policy, in this sense, is an escape from the constraints of the Brussel.

Considering the current Covid-19 situation the world faces, it would not be hard to say that the aims of “Global Britain” are facing difficulties. Nevertheless, Covid-19 is not the sole cause of the problems. In his “Five Foreign Policy Questions for the UK’s Next Prime Minister,” article Thomas Raines shows some discrepancies in the British foreign policy. He claims that Britain is both supporting the UN-led Yemen peace process and selling guns to Saudi Arabia, restricting migration which is crucial for services trade while having ambitious trade policies, and creates problems for issuing visas while claiming to give importance to soft power(Five Foreign Policy Questions for the UK’s Next Prime Minister, 2019). “Global Britain” has coincided with the era that the globalization has stalled.

On the economic side, leaving the EU puts Britain in a vulnerable position against China. As China is expanding its influence over many parts of the world, Britain poses no exception. Both parties are open to trade agreements but having a greater economy puts China in an advantageous position. Increasing Chinese influence in Britain could also affect Britain’s relations with the United States. 5G problem showed that Britain is more open to pressures now compared to the time when she was in the EU. Also, on the diplomacy and defense issues, there is a budget problem. As Britain wants to open to the world more and contribute to global stability, she would require greater resources to do that. Having high aims and facing budget cuts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office do not go well together. Britain should first decide what does she want clearly.

Leaving the EU, which provided free trade with countries that Britain does the vast majority of her trades, does not seem logical. On top of that, geographical proximity is a price decreasing feature which Britain could not have if she focuses on BRICS countries which are far further than Europe and mostly follow protectionist trade policies(Now Is the Worst Time for “global Britain” | Centre for European Reform, n.d.). Britain’s desperateness for a trade deal puts her in a very exploitable position. The most reliable partner, the US, has also tried to benefit from this situation. Trump administration official told the BBC that, if the UK wanted a good trade deal, it had better “realign [its] foreign policy away from Brussels” and dump the Iran nuclear deal which he also imposed on Germany and France(Britain Voted for Independence, but It Has Achieved Isolation, n.d.).

            In conclusion, while Britain’s move to achieve “Global Britain” sounds optimistic and positive, despite not having a clear definition, the reality shows a different picture than those ambitious aims. Trying to achieve “independence” in a global world has been a costly act for Britain. Abandoning the old relations with the EU to establish a new one and expanding the trade agreements to many countries worldwide came in a challenging time for Britain as Covid-19 affected all countries’ economies. While it allows Britain to open up new economic relations with other parts of the world, it requires her to abandon free trade privileges within the EU and put Britain in a vulnerable position. So, while having its benefits, it would not be a good compensation for weakening the EU pillar in British foreign policy.

References

• Beyond Brexit: A Global Britain. (n.d.). GOV.UK. Retrieved November 1, 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/beyond-brexit-a-global-britain
• Britain voted for independence, but it has achieved isolation. (n.d.). ECFR. Retrieved November 1, 2020, from https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_britain_voted_for_independence_but_it_has_achieved_isolation/
• Five Foreign Policy Questions for the UK’s Next Prime Minister. (2019, June 18). Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/five-foreign-policy-questions-uks-next-prime-minister
• Foreign Affairs Committee, H. of C. (2018). Global Britain—Sixth Report of Session 2017-19. House of Commons. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/780.pdf
• Now is the worst time for “global Britain” | Centre for European Reform. (n.d.). Retrieved November 1, 2020, from https://www.cer.eu/insights/now-worst-time-global-britain
• The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech. (n.d.). GOV.UK. Retrieved November 1, 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech
• The real meaning of ‘Global Britain’: A Great Escape from the EU. (2019, April 5). EUROPP. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/04/05/the-real-meaning-of-global-britain-a-great-escape-from-the-eu/

The structural realist’s theory misses that yes, states’ primary objective is the security, but who defines it, who puts the ways to ensure it. Ends and means are the missing part of the theory. Most states’ leaders have a prominent ability to shape the process of constructing these concepts, more or less whatever the state’s regime is. A leader becomes significant in foreign policy issues under four conditions (Hermann, 2001, s. 85). Firstly, he/she has a general interest in foreign policy, like Putin. Secondly, if a crisis is born out, the issue may jump over the bureaucracy and lead the leader to be involved. Thirdly,  an issue may needs leaders to come together, such as an international summit. Lastly, the leader may have a special interest in a particular issue (Breuning, 2007, s. 31).

Therefore understanding the leader’s traits can help researchers. In similar circumstances, leaders with different characteristics had led to different foreign policy outcomes. For example, the question of British involvement in Vietnam and Iraq takes place in similar environmental pressures such as domestic opposition and the ally’s wish. Leaders may differ in their style as goal-driven or responsive to the context they operate within (Hermann, 2001, s. 87). What made the difference is the characteristics of different leaders (Dyson, 2007, p. 648).

Constrain respecter leaders try to fit their acts in the needs of context, and making decisions is a calculation process relating to other domestic actors’ responses. They are open to extensive information networks because they want to fit in changing demands of the public. They are also not initiators in the foreign policy unless the constituents push for an action (Hermann, 2001, s. 88-90). Unlike respecters, challengers are motivated by their goals. They evaluate the context according to their “beliefs, attitudes, and passions.” These leaders are unease about changing their beliefs, so they tend to encircle themselves with like-minded colleagues (Smith, 2012). According to them, constraints are something that should be dealt with (Hermann, 2001, s. 91). However

Although the understanding of the special relationship among British decision-makers, which underline the British interest from the alliance, would lead some people incorrectly to assume Britain would support every action of the US, Wilson declined the request of Johnson sending soldiers in Vietnam, even if the US’ request was a few soldiers in a symbolic manner and even if the British economy was depended on the US for loans at the time (Dyson, 2007, p. 649). Despite having the same domestic constraints like Blair, Wilson was a constraint respecter who bowed to public opinion. However, for Blair, the alliance was a tool for his foreign policy goals. Although there was constant opposition within the cabinet, within Labours, and among the public, like the “Stop the War” rally, Blair decided to join the Iraq war mostly thanks to his leadership style (2007, p. 654).

After explaining how a leader can be important and influential in decision-making processes, now it is time to focus on Tony Blair’s characteristic. In the Leadership Trait Analysis method, Tony Blair distinguished three out of seven traits from the average of the fifty-one political leaders (Dyson S. B., 2006, s. 289). In this methodology, each trait was linked to a specific way of decision-making behaviours. These are high belief in his ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. To overcome beforehand prepared speech, Dyson only used the spontaneous answer of Blair in the parliament, which also make it more coherent because of the elimination of different audiences.

High belief in ability to control events stands for the leader’s perception about him/herself as being influential over its environment. Leaders with high scores in this trait tend to be more pro-active and less cautious about environmental constraints both at the domestic and international level (Dyson S. B., 2006, s. 295). This is what we see in the Iraq case. The speech called Doctrine of the International Community is one of the most precise indicators of this. In the speech, Blair described how and why they should transcend the principle of non-interventionism. Also, during the crisis, he always believed in himself being able to push other actors into his orbits, such as Bush, the British public, and the parliament. He always talked about how he was able to influence others (2006, s. 298).

His second distinguishing trait is his low conceptual complexity. Leaders with a low score more tend to describe their environment with clear-cut distinctions like black and white. With a less complicated world in their mind, these kinds of leaders decide with limited information. They do not seek wide-range discussion on the topic (Breuning, 2007, s. 44-45). Therefore, they can be more aggressive and assertive (Dyson S. B., 2006, s. 295). Describing the Saddam regime, he made a straightforward distinction: they were ‘good,’ and Saddam was ‘bad.’ As his colleagues stated, Blair had not paid attention to other policy options put by a different actor (2006, s. 299). Moreover, his view of alliance with the US was a question of all or nothing, so he did not look for softer options like just saying yes to political support.

The last but not least differentiation of Blair was his high score on the need for power. This indicates a high desire to acquire, preserve, or revive the personal power over policy-making mechanism. They want to ensure that the policy outcome reflects their preferences rather than group-consensus (Dyson S. B., 2006, s. 295). To achieve keeping a close watch on policy-making processes, they design their relations with colleagues in a certain way. They try to keep the discussion within a small group of people who are like-minded and loyal to him/her. This is precisely what Blair did with his personal advisors, called ‘team’ or ‘the den,’ fearing to lose control over any issue (2006, s. 301). In the cabinet, he subtly dictated his decisions, which already had been made.

In summary, while examining states’ foreign policy actions, it essential to focus more on leaders if the environment allows them to be more influential. How capable a leader of influencing foreign policy decisions depends on his/her characteristic and the context within which they operate (Breuning, 2007, s. 33). As discussed above, it is evident that Tony Blair’s leadership traits, high belief in his ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power, were influential in the British decision to be involved in the Iraq War 2003. Without understanding the minds of leaders, it is hard to establish concrete explanations for international issues.

References

• Breuning, M. (2007). Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction,. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Dyson, S. B. (2006). Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions. Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2., 289–306.
• Dyson, S. B. (2007). Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq? Political Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 6, , 647-666.
• Hermann, M. (2001). Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals. International Studies Review 3(2), 83-131 .
• Smith, C. (2012). E-International Relations. Retrieved from Personality in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/16/personality-in-foreign-policy-decision-making/